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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of The Case
This case arises out of a dispute regarding an insurance claim filed by the Appellant, Villa

Highlands, LLC ("Villa Highlands") under its builder's risk insurance policy with Western
Community Insurance Company ("Western Community") after the Villa Highlands building was
destroyed by fire in May 2006. While Villa Highlands 01iginally asse1ted a number of claims against
Western Community with regard to the manner in which Western Community investigated and
adjusted the insurance claim at issue, by the time of trial the issues were significantly narrowed such
that the only issue tried by Villa Highlands was whether Western Community was vicariously liable
for its insurance agent's alleged negligent failure to ensure that that Villa Highlands building was
adequately insured.
The case proceeded to trial, with the jury finding that Western Community's insurance agent
was not negligent. Therefore, Western Community was not found liable on the basis of vicarious
liability. These issues are not before the Court on appeal. Rather, the Court is being asked to reverse
certain pre-trial rulings made by the trial court related to procedural matters, the scope of the
pleadings and the dismissal of Villa Highlands' breach of contract and declaratory judgment claims
against Western Community.
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B.

Statement Of The Facts

1.

Objection to Villa Highlands' Statement of Facts

Western Community objects to Villa Highlands' Statement of Facts because it contains
information irrelevant to this appeal, mischaracterizes the record, contains unsupported assertions
that are contrary to the record, and obfuscates the proper chronology of events. For example:
a.

Appellant attempts to infer that the sole cause of its underinsuring the Villa

Highlands building was due to Western Community's insurance agent, Dale Zimney, advising
Appellant to rely upon the hard costs contained in the original construction budget to determine the
amount of coverage for the policy. Appellant's Brief, p. 1. Respondent would note that the reasons
as to why the Villa Highland building was inadequately insured by the Appellant is not an issue
currently before the Court on appeal. Rather, this appeal is concerned with the manner in which the
insurable loss was calculated by Western Community pursuant to the insurance policy, as well as the
interpretation of several policy provisions.

2.

Course of Proceedings

Plaintiff Villa Highlands is a company which was organized for the purposes of providing an
independent living community for the elderly. R., p. 171, Second Amended Complaint, 1[ I. The
Villa Highlands building began construction in 2005 and was designed as a three story, fifty-unit
facility located at the Northwest Corner of 15 th Street and Hill Road in Boise, Idaho. Id., 1[ 6.
Western Community Insurance Company is an Idaho corporation licensed to issue policies of
insurance in the state of Idaho. Certificate of Exhibits ("COE"), Exh. 11, Affidavit of Richard

Peterson ("Peterson Aff."), 'l[ 3.
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In early April 2005, Bill Hodges, the principal of Villa Highlands, met with Dale Zimney, an
insurance agent authorized to sell insurance for Fmm Bureau and Western Community, to discuss
builder's risk insurance for the Villa Highlands project. See COE, Exh. 12, Affidavit of Robert A.
Anderson ("Anderson Aff."), Exh. A, Hodges Depo Vol. I, pp. 67-69. At this time, Hodges had not
yet secured financing for the project, but was working on a loan through First Horizon Construction
Lending. Id., p. 74. Hodges met a second time with Zimney on April 4, 2005, whereby Hodges
discussed the appropriate amount of builder's risk coverage to purchase in order to cover the project.

Id., p. 80.
At the April 4 th meeting, Mr. Hodges determined that the amount of coverage under a
Western Community Builder's Risk policy should be $5.3 million. Hodges Depo, Vol. I, p. 81.
Hodges determined that number based on a construction budget he had prepared with his
construction manager, Steve Dresser. Id. It was Hodges' belief that he was buying a builder's risk
policy based on the amount of his construction budget for costs he thought he would incur in the
event of a catastrophic loss during the course of construction, i.e., what it would cost if the building
were destroyed. Id., pp. 90-91.
Villa Highlands' prospective lender at the time, First Horizon, had completed an appraisal of
the project on March 15, 2005. See COE, Exh. 12, Anderson Aff, Exh. G. That appraisal provided
that the project's worth at the proposed date of completion was $7,700,000. Id. Mr. Hodges has
testified that, while he was not provided with a copy of the appraisal immediately after it was
completed, he received a copy approximately six months after it was completed. See COE, Exh. 12,
Anderson Affidavit, Exh. A Hodges Depo, Vol I, p. 79. However, he never gave his agent, Dale
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Zimney, a copy of the appraisal. Id. On June I, 2005, First Horizon notified Villa Highlands' agent,
Dale Zimney, that the applicable amount of coverage for Villa Highlands' builder's risk policy
should be increased to $5,645,000. Anderson Aff, Exh. L This is the amount reflected in Villa
Highlands' application for builder's risk insurance. Id., Exh. C (bates no. DZ 55).
Pursuant to this application, Western Community issued Villa Highlands a Builder's Risk
policy in the amount of $5,645,000. See COE, Exh. 12, Anderson Affidavit, Exh. D. Villa
Highlands' Policy provides notice that various provisions in the policy restrict coverage and that the
owner should read the entire policy "to determine rights, duties and what is and is not covered."
Anderson Aff, Exh. E., p. I. Mr. Hodges has testified that he did review the Policy in its entirety.
Hodges Depo, Vol I, pp. 100-101; Andserson Aff, Exh. B, Hodges Depo Vol II, pp. 191, 192.

Villa Highlands' Policy provides that it provides coverage "for direct physical loss of or
damage to Covered Property at the premises described in the Declarations caused by or resulting
from any Covered Cause of Loss. See COE, Exh. 12,AndersonAff, Exh. E, Policy, A. I., p. I. The
Policy also notes that, in the event of a covered loss, Western Community would either: (I) pay the
value of lost or damaged property or (2) pay the cost of repairing or replacing the lost or damaged
property. Id., Policy, E.4.(a),I & 2, p. 5. Further, the Policy states that Western Community would
determine the cost of repairing or replacing damaged prope1ty "in accordance with the applicable
terms of the Valuation Condition in this Coverage Form or any applicable provision which amends
or supercedes the Valuation Condition. Id., Policy E.4., p. 5.
The Policy's Valuation Condition states that Western Community would "determine the
value of Covered Prope1ty at actual cash value as of the time of loss or damage." Policy, E.6., p. 6.
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The Policy also contained several restrictions and limiting conditions, including the requirement that
the Project be adequately insured. See Policy, F.2., p. 6. The co-insurance condition in the Policy
(titled the "Need for Adequate Insurance" clause), notes that Villa Highlands:

Will not pay a greater share of any loss than the prop011ion that the
Limit of Insurance bears to the value on the date of completion of the
building described in the Declarations.
Policy, F.2., p. 6. In the event of a loss, the Policy also contains provisions governing any dispute

between the insurer and insured with respect to the applicable amount to be assigned to the value of
the property or value of the loss. The Policy provides:

If we and you disagree on the value of the property or the amount of
loss, either may make written demand for an appraisal of the loss. In
this event, each party will select a competent and impartial appraiser.
The two appraisers will select an umpire. If they cannot agree, either
may request that selection be made by a judge or court having
jurisdiction. The appraisers will state separately the value of the
property and amount of loss. If they fail to agree, they will submit
their differences to the umpire. A decision agreed to by any two will
be binding.
Policy, E.2., p. 4 (Emphasis added).

Mr. Hodges did not have any contact with his insurance agent, Dale Zimney, until April 2006
when various insurance policies with regard to the Project came up for renewal. See COE, Exh. 12,
Anderson Affulavit, Exh. A, Hodges Depo, Vol I, p. 92. During the April 2006 meeting, the

discussion included the amount of insurance under Villa Highlands' Builder's Risk Policy. Id., pp.
93, 101-102. Mr. Hodges was asked if he felt the Project was adequately covered and Hodges
replied that he did not believe anything needed to be changed under the Policy. Id. Once again,
although Mr. Hodges knew that the Project, minus the value of the land, would be worth at least
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$7,160,000 upon completion (See COE, Exh. 12, Anderson Aff., Exh. G), he did not increase the
amount of coverage under his Builder's Risk Policy. Hodges Depo, Vol I, p. 93. In fact, an updated
appraisal of the Project was completed by Villa Highlands' lender on August 25, 2006, which
determined that the value of the Project, minus the value of the land, was $7,950,000. See COE,
Exh. 12, Anderson Aff., Exh. H.
On May 21, 2006, while the Villa Highlands Building was still under construction, it caught
fire and suffered extensive damage. See R., p. 173, Second Amended Complaint,

1[

8. Villa

Highlands estimated that, at the time of the loss, the Project was between 50-60% completed from a
cost standpoint, while 75% completed from a timeline standpoint. See COE, Exh. 12, Anderson
Aff., Exh. B, Hodges Depo, Vol II, pp. 261-262. On July 24, 2006, Villa Highlands formally
submitted its insurance claim for the cost to reconstruct the Project. COE, Exh. 12, Anderson Aff.,
Exh. F.
In investigating and adjusting Villa Highlands' claimed loss, Western Community created a
spreadsheet which represents the calculations utilized by Western Community in dete1mining the
amount Villa Highlands was entitled to be paid for the loss under its Builder's Risk Policy. See
COE, Exh. 11, Petersen Aff., Exh. A. While Western Community disagreed with Villa Highlands
with regard to the estimated value of the Building on the date of completion (its own evaluation of
the value of the building was higher), it still utilized the lower figure presented by Villa Highlands in
the amount of $7,160,000 (the amount reflected in First Horizon's March 15, 2005 appraisal). The
result of this action was that it effectively reduced the amount that Villa Highlands had underinsured
its building. The spreadsheet notes that the limit of insurance under the Policy was $5,645,000. Id.
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Western Community valued the amount of Villa Highlands' loss as a result of the fire at $3,967,157.

Id.
Below the line showing Western Community's calculation of the amount of the loss, the
Policy's "need for adequate insurance" calculation was performed pursuant to§ F.2. of the Policy.

Id. That calculation revealed that Villa Highlands was below the 100% co-insurance amount set
fo11h in the declarations. 1 Therefore, Western Community reduced the amount of recoverable loss to
$3,127,207. This was the amount Western Community paid to Villa Highlands under the Policy,
after deducting the applicable deductible. See COE, Exh. 12, Anderson Aff., Exh, J. p. 5.
Villa Highlands disputed the figures utilized by Western Community in determining both the
value of the loss and the value of the building on the date of completion for purposes of calculating
the amount of Villa Highlands' underinsurance under the Policy. On October 11, 2006, Western
Community sent a letter to Villa Highlands advising it that, due to Villa Highlands' dispute as to the
value of the building, Western Community was invoking the appraisal clause of the Policy in an
attempt to resolve the dispute. See COE, Exh. 2, Affidavit of Robert A. Anderson in Support of

Motion to Compel Appraisal ("Anderson Aff. II"), Exh. B.
On October 20, 2006, Western Community advised Villa Highlands that it had retained Joe
Corlett of Mountain States Appraisal to conduct an appraisal on its behalf. COE, Exh. 2,Anderson

Aff II, Exh. C. On October 30, 2006, counsel for Villa Highlands responded to the notice invoking
the appraisal clause. Id., Exh. D. While Villa Highlands did not agree that the issues were the

l In order 10 calculaie the amount of under-insurance, Western Community took the Limit oflnsurance, $5,645,000 and
divided it by the value of the building on the date of completion, $7,160,000, which revealed that the proportion of the
Limit of Insurance to the Value on Date of Completion was .7884. The amount of the loss, $3,967.157, was then
multiplied by .7884 to determine the amount Western Community would pay under the Policy, i.e., $3,127,207.
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proper subject of an appraisal determination, it stated that it had chosen James Brown of James
Brown & Associates to conduct an appraisal on its behalf.

On November 8, 2006 Western

Community wrote to counsel for Villa Highlands expressing the need for both appraisers to get in
contact with each other as soon as possible to expedite the process and reach an agreeable
conclusion. Id., Exh. E.
When no response was received, Western Community once again contacted counsel for Villa
Highlands on December 4, 2006, noting that Western Community had completed its appraisal
through Mr. Corlett and informing Villa Highlands that its appraiser had yet to get in contact with
Corlett. COE, Exh. 2, Anderson Aff II, Exh. F.
Although it was Western Community's belief that the appraisal process set forth under the
Policy was underway, on December 6, 2006, Villa Highlands initiated active litigation by filing its
Amended Complaint against Western Community. R., p. 74. 2 In the Amended Complaint, Villa
Highlands asserted, in Count One, a claim for breach of contract against Western Community.
Under that claim, Villa Highlands asserted that it had a contractual relationship with Western
Community pursuant to a builder's risk insurance policy and, after a fire in which the Villa
Highlands building suffered catastrophic damages, it submitted a claim to Western Community
under its policy. R., p. 77-78. Villa Highlands asserted that Western Community refused to
negotiate the loss claim in good faith and refused to pay the full amount of the claim. R., p. 78-79.
Further, Villa Highlands claimed that Western Community's actions deprived it of the full benefits
of the Policy. R., p. 81.

2 Although Villa Highlands filed an original Complaint on November 13, 2006, that pleading was never served upon
Western Community.
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Villa Highlands also suhmitted a claim for declaratory relief under the Amended Complaint,
asserting that the Court should declare the relative rights and obligations of the pa11ies under the
Policy and determine that Villa Highlands was entitled to the payment of the full amount due and
owing pursuant to the Policy without any reduction or offset. R., p. 83. Further, Villa Highlands
alleged, under Counts Three and Four, that Western Community was liable for bad faith and breach
of fiduciary duty with regard to the manner in which it adjusted and paid its claim, negligence (Count
Five) for failing to properly investigate and pay Villa Highlands' claim in accordance with the terms
of the Policy and misrepresentation (Count Six) with regard to instructions Western Community
allegedly provided in connection with Villa Highlands' procurement of the Policy. R., pp. 84-93.
Over a month later, on January 10, 2007, Western Community sent another letter to counsel
for Villa Highlands, summarizing a conversation in which counsel for Villa Highlands apparently
represented that their client had not retained an appraiser. See COE, Exh. 2,Anderson Aff. ll, Exh.
G. Western Community noted in the letter that it was eager to resolve the matter and noted Villa
Highlands' duty to cooperate in the investigation and/or settlement of the claim. Villa Highlands
never provided a timely response to Western Community's correspondence.
On or about January 23, 2007, Western Community answered Villa Highlands' Amended
Complaint and asserted a Counterclaim against it, alleging that Villa Highlands has refused to
cooperate with Western Community's efforts to investigate the loss and adjust the claim, as well as
refused to participate in the appraisal process set forth under the terms its Policy. R., p. 142.
On January 26, 2007, counsel for Villa Highlands wrote to Western Community, informing it
that James Brown had conducted an appraisal on behalf of Villa Highlands and requesting that
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Western Community provide a copy of Corlett's appraisal so it could be determined whether the
parties actually disagreed as to the value of the property or value of the loss. See COE, Exh. 2,

Anderson Aff.l/, Exh. H. On February 1, 2007, Western Community sent correspondence to counsel
for Villa Highlands informing Villa Highlands that it was not complying with the appraisal process
set out in the Policy and that when Mr. Corlett contacted Villa Highlands' appraiser, James Brown,
to discuss the appraisal with him, Mr. Brown indicated that he had not been retained as Villa
Highlands' appraiser. Id., Exh. I.
On or about February 20, 2007, counsel for Villa Highlands sent counsel for Western
Community a letter inquiring whether Western Community was disputing Villa Highlands' position
with regard to the value of the property or the amount of the loss due to the fire. See COB, Exh. 2,

Anderson Aff. ll, Exh. J. Counsel for Villa Highlands also asserted that, according to her records,
there was nothing to suggest that Western Community disagreed with Villa Highlands' value of the
property or amount of the loss necessitating the use of the appraisal process specified under the
Policy. Id.
On February 23, 2007, Western Community responded to counsel for Villa Highlands by
stating that it should have been clear to Villa Highlands that Western Community disagreed with the
value of the property and amount of the loss, especially since Villa Highlands had made extensive
use of Mr. Corlett's appraisal during an earlier mediation between the parties. Id., Exh. K. Further,
on March 16, 2007, Western Community's counsel responded to Villa Highland's inquiry, noting
Western Community's position that Villa Highlands had miscalculated the amount of the loss by
requesting payment for portions of the building which were not completed at the time of the fire. Id.,
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Exh. L. Further, Western Community requested that Villa Highlands agree to the dispute resolution
procedure outlined in its Builder's Risk policy. Id.
On March 27, 2007, counsel for Villa Highlands sent a letter to Western Community stating
that Villa Highlands was agreeable with cooperating with the appraisal and/or dispute resolution
process set forth in the insurance policy at issue. COE, Exh. 2,AndersonAff II, Exh. M. On March
29, 2007, Western Community sent a letter to Villa Highlands' counsel confirming its choice of an
appraiser and noting its understanding with respect to the individual who would be representing Villa
Highlands in the appraisal process. Anderson Aff II, Exh. N. The letter also noted that the two
appraisers should mutually agree on an umpire pursuant to the terms of the Policy. Id.

On

November 5, 2007, Western Community sent a letter to counsel for Villa Highlands once again
communicating frustration with Villa Highlands' lack of response and failure to move forward with
the appraisal process. Anderson Aff II, Exh. 0. Thus, on December 14, 2007, Western Community
filed a Motion to Compel Appraisal, seeking an Order compelling Villa Highlands to comply with
the terms of the Policy and engage in the appraisal process set forth therein, whereby Villa
Highlands' loss could be fully and finally determined. COE, Exh. I.
In an effort to resolve the issues related to the dispute regarding the value of the loss and
value of the building, both parties began discussing a Stipulation that was ultimately signed on
January 17, 2008, whereby the parties stipulated that the value of the building, for purposes of
calculation of the underinsurance provision (§ F.2 of the Policy), would be $7,580,000, while the
amount of Villa Highlands' loss would be $3,967,157.00. See Appendix, Exh. A.
The effect of this Stipulation was that there was no longer any dispute between the parties as
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to whether Western Community had paid the claim according to the dictates of the Policy or whether
it had miscalculated the value of the building or value of Villa Highlands' loss. Indeed, the fact that
Western Community's loss payment obligations were no longer a part of the suit was reflected in the
Second Amended Complaint filed by Villa Highlands on January 8, 2008. R., p. 170. Under the
Second Amended Complaint, Villa Highlands voluntarily dismissed its claims for direct breach of
contract, bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty and misrepresentation.
Moreover, in its Second Amended Complaint, Villa Highlands nanowed and re-focused the
nature of the claims in this case. Villa Highlands asserted that its insurance agent, Dale Zimney, was
negligent and breached his contract with Villa Highlands by failing to ensure that it adequately
insured the Project and failing to procure full and complete coverage for the building. R., pp. 171175. In other words, Villa Highlands asserted that the building was inadequately insured and it was
unable to secure full payment for its loss under the Policy due to bad advice given by its insurance
agent, Dale Zimney. Villa Highlands also alleged, in Count 4, that Mr. Zimney's t01t and contractual
liability was imputed to Western Community under agency theory.
Under that count of the Second Amended Complaint, Villa Highlands maintained that Mr.
Zimney had a contract with Western Community authorizing him to sell its insurance policies and
products to consumers.

R., p. 176, q[ 23.

Fmther, Villa Highlands claimed that Western

Community's conduct and actions gave rise to Mr. Zimney having apparent authority to bind
Western Community for representations made by Zimney to Villa Highlands. R., p. 177, 11 25.
Finally, Villa Highlands charged that, based upon Zimney's apparent authority, Western Community
was bound by his representations concerning the subject policy. R., p. 177, 1[ 27. A similar vicarious
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liability was also stated in tort under Count 5 of the Second Amended Complaint.
Villa Highlands also modified the Declaratory Judgment claim under the Second Amended
Complaint. Villa Highlands noted that Western Community applied the "Need For Adequate
Insurance" provision of the Policy to reduce the amount of the loss against the policy limits paid
under the Policy. R., p. 179, 9[ 33.

However, due to the imputed liability against Western

Community due to Mr. Zimney's alleged negligence and breach of contract, Villa Highlands asked
the court to find that it was entitled to the full amount of its insurance claim, without reduction due
to being found underinsured under the Policy. R., p. 179, 9[ 34-35.
On March 3, 2008, Western Community filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. R., p. 209.
The Motion sought dismissal of Villa Highlands' claims on five separate bases: (1) that Farm Bureau
was not a proper defendant in the case; (2) that Count 4 of the Second Amended Complaint,
asserting a claim for vicarious liability against Western Community due to Mr. Zimney's breach of
contract, was untenable under Idaho law; (3) that Count 5 of the Second Amended Complaint,
asserting a claim for vicarious liability against Western Community due to Mr. Zimney's alleged
tortious acts, was not supported under Idaho law due to Mr. Zimney' s independent contractor status
with Western Community, (4) Villa Highlands' declaratory judgment action was moot due to the
Stipulation reached between the parties, and (5) the facts in the record failed to establish a viable
claim for promissory estoppel against Western Community. COE, Exh. 10.
Prior to the hearing on Western Community's Motion, on March 6, 2008, counsel for Villa
Highlands filed a Motion for Leave to Withdraw as counsel of record and a Motion to Vacate Trial.
The motion was heard on March 12, 2008. It was Western Community's understanding that the
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Motion was initiated because Bill Hodges from Villa Highlands wanted to terminate the Davison
Copple firm and procure new counsel as a result of disagreements with the litigation strategy
Davison Copple was employing in litigating the case.

During the hearing, the district court

recognized the inherent problems associated with the withdrawal of counsel less than two months
prior to the case being set to commence for trial, but noted that resetting the trial for approximately
one year down the road was prejudicial to the defendants in the case. Tr., March 12, 2008, pp. 4-5.
Further, noting that the time period for Villa Highlands to respond to Western Community's Motion
for Summary judgment would occur during the 20 day period allotted for Villa Highlands to procure
new counsel, the Court extended the date for the summary judgment hearing until April 9, 2008. Id.,
pp. 6-7. However, the district court ruled that no continuance of the trial would be granted. Id., p.
10.
Perkins Coie entered a Notice of Appearance on behalf of Villa Highlands on March 21,
2008. R., p. 228.

3

Almost immediately upon being involved in the case, new counsel for Villa

Highlands began asserting its desire to void the portion of the prior Stipulation between the parties
with regard to the value of the building. Thus, on April 3, 2008, Western Community filed its
Motion to Reset Hearing on the Motion to Compel Appraisal. R., p. 241. The hearing on Western
Community's Motion for Summary Judgment was conducted on April 9, 2008.
During that hearing, counsel for Villa Highlands asserted that his client had a continuing
disagreement with the manner in which Western Community valued the building for the purpose of
adjusting the loss and the Stipulation did not resolve the dispute between the parties with regard to

3 It should be noted that Cynthia Yee-Wallace, who is representing Villa Highlands as a member of the firm Perkins
Coie, was previously involved in the representation of Villa Highlands when it was represented by the firm Davidson
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the value of the building on the date of completion for purposes of calculating the underinsurance
penalty under the Policy. Counsel for Western Community noted that the purpose of the Stipulation
was to resolve both parts of the equation that went into determining the proper payment of the claim
in connection with the underinsurance provision of the Policy - the value of the building and the
value of the loss. Tr., April 9, 2008, pp. 75-76.
The district court ultimately determined during the summary judgment hearing that, under
Villa Highlands' declaratory judgment cause of action, the insurance policy was unambiguous and
that the te1m "value" for purposes of calculating the value of the building for purposes of loss
payment was "actual cash value." Tr., April 9, 2008, pp. 80-81. The court further relieved Villa
Highlands from paragraph 1 of the Stipulation and granted Western Community's Motion to Compel
Appraisal, noting that the appraisal process, including the submission of the two appraisals to a
mutually agreeable umpire for final decision, was to be completed prior to trial.

Id., p. 88.

However, the portion of the Stipulation regarding the value of Villa Highlands' loss, $3,967,157.00,
remained in effect. Id., p. 96. Thus, the parties agreed that they would submit their appraisals of the
value of the building on the date of completion to each other, mutually choose an umpire and allow
the umpire to determine which appraisal to utilize for purposes of the claim. It should be noted that
the reason this value was important in this case was the fact that this valuation was determinative of
whether Villa Highlands was adequately insured under the Policy and whether Western Community
had properly reduced the loss claim clue to the application of the "need for adequate insurance"
provision under the Policy.

Copple.
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During the summary judgment hearing, the Court also granted the Motion to dismiss Farm
Bureau as a defendant in the suit. Tr., April 9, 2008, pp. 116-117. On the vicarious liability claims
(Counts 4 & 5 of the Second Amended Complaint), the court began to deny the summary judgment
motion, although later noting that further research and discussion of the issues would be conducted
prior to an ultimate decision and trial. Id., p. 122-123.
The parties submitted additional briefing on the vicarious liability claims on April l l, 2008.
Further, On April 15, 2008, Villa Highlands filed a Motion to Compel depositions of certain Western
Community personnel which had recently been scheduled. R., p. 248. Western Community
responded to the Motion to Compel by filing a Motion for Protective Order on April 15, 2008. R., p.
251. The basis for Western Community's motion was that the claims against it in Counts 4 & 5 of
the Second Amended Complaint were vicarious in nature and, since there were no direct claims
against it, discovery regarding the actions of Western Community personnel related to the
investigation and adjustment of the loss was beyond the pleadings in the case.
A hearing was held on April 16, 2008 to resolve the competing motions regarding the
depositions of Western Community personnel. During the hearing, counsel for Villa Highlands
represented his client's position that Count 4 actually asserted a direct breach of contract claim
against Western Community, making the requested discovery relevant. Tr., April 16, 2008, pp. 1719. In fact, counsel for Villa Highlands went one step further and represented in open court that his
client was not asserting Count 4 on the basis that Western Community was vicariously liable for Mr.
Zimney's breach of contract to Villa Highlands. Id., pp. 21-23. The Court reviewed the record and
determined that Count 4 of the Second Amended Complaint did not state a direct breach of contract
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claim against Western Community. Id., p. 102, Tr., April 17, 2008, pp. 136, 207-208. Accordingly,
the only count against Western Community at trial was whether it was vicariously liable for
Zimney's negligence.
In the two weeks prior to trial, the parties completed the appraisal process set forth under the
insurance contract. The umpire chosen by the parties agreed with Western Community's appraisal
and, therefore, determined that the $3,127,207 previously paid by Western Community for the loss
was appropriate. Affidavit of Cynthia Yee-Wallace in Support of Motion for Relief from

Judgment, Exh. Y (submitted under Appellant's Second Motion to Augment Record).
On the morning of the first day of trial, the Court took up the issue of the admissibility of
several items of evidence pursuant to Western Community's Motion in Li mine. Tr., May 5, 2009.
During the hearing, counsel for Villa Highlands once again noted the parties' stipulation that the
amount of Villa Highlands' loss was $3,967,000 and that the amount paid by Western Community
for the loss was $3,127,207, leaving a difference of approximately $850,000 which Villa Highlands
asserted represented its damages it would be stating at trial. Tr., May 5, 2008, pp. 10-11.
During the hearing before trial commenced, counsel for Villa Highlands noted, on several
occasions, that they were not going to challenge the appraisal process. Tr, May 5, 2008, pp. 7, 1213, 18-19, 21-23. Counsel specifically represented:
I just wanted to say that with respect to the appraisal process, we
aren't waiving our right to challenge that on appeal. We reserve our
right to challenge on appeal, but for purposes solely for this trial, we
are not challenging that.
Tr., May 5, 2008, p. 7 (emphasis added). Indeed, counsel noted that Villa Highlands had "accepted
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the appraisal process." Id., p. 18. 4 Hence, this constituted the end of the appraisal process under the
Policy and there was nothing more for the Court to decide under the declaratory action. See, e.g., R.,
p. 282, 'I[ 4. Trial on the matter proceeded and, on May 13, 2008, the jury determined that Villa
Highlands' negligence was greater than that of Mr. Zimney and that there was not an oral contract
between Mr. Zimney and Villa Highlands. R., p. 288. Thus, there was no basis for vicarious liability
against Western Community. Id.
On May 22, 2008, Villa Highlands objected in general fashion to the proposed Judgment
submitted by Western Community on the basis that not all of its claims pending against Western
Community had been dismissed. R., p. 293. On May 27, 2008, the Court entered its Judgment,
dismissing Villa Highlands' claims against Western Community. R., p. 296. On July 8, 2008, Villa
Highlands filed its Motion to Relief from Judgment, asserting that Count Six of the Second
Amended Complaint, the claim for declaratory relief, had not been resolved or concluded. Also on
July 8, 2008, Villa Highlands filed its Notice of Appeal. R., p. 301. On August 26, 2008, the Court
denied Villa Highlands' Motion on the basis that no issues related to the declaratory action were tried
in the matter and that the completion of the appraisal process and Villa Highlands' non-objection to
that process rendered the claim for declaratory relief moot and/or of no further consequence to the
action. See, Appendix B, "Decision and Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Judgment."

4 It should be noted that in its Appellate Brief, Villa Highlands represents that told the district court that it was not
challenging the appraisal process for purposes of the ''.jury trial." Thus, the implication is that somehow Villa
Highlands had reserved the right to challenge the appraisal in front of the district court after the jury trial was
completed. However, a review of the hearing transcript clearly evidences that no such distinction was made and Villa
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II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
Western Community does not take issue with the manner in which Villa Highlands has
framed the issues for appeal.

III. COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL
Pursuant to I.A.R. 40 and 41, along with Idaho Code§§ 12-120(3) and 12-121, Western
Community respectfully requests an award of its costs and attorney's fees on appeal. Western
Community would also note that its request for costs and fees has been asserted, in large measure, on
the basis that Villa Highlands' appeal is frivolous and without merit, especially since Villa
Highlands' complaints on appeal involve issues related to failures in its own litigation strategy and/or
failure to follow the District Court's rulings, rather than appealable error.

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court Correctly Concluded that Count Four of Plaintiff's Second
Amended Complaint did not State a Direct Breach of Contract Claim against Western
Community
Western Community asserts that Villa Highlands has not identified the correct standard of

review with regard to this issue. Villa Highlands has asserted a standard of review under a 12(b)(6)
Motion to Dismiss a complaint. However, no such motion was ever filed with respect to Count 4 of
the Second Amended Complaint. As noted in the procedural history above, the issue of the viability
of Count 4 was asserted in Western Community's Motion for Summary Judgment.
As noted above, in the Amended Complaint, Villa Highlands asserted a claim for breach of
contract against Western Community. Under that claim, Villa Highlands asserted that it had a

Highlands noted that they would not be contesting the appraisal process during the entirety of the trial of this matter.

19

contractual relationship with Western Community pursuant to a builder's risk insurance policy and,
after a fire in which the Villa Highlands building suffered catastrophic damages, it submitted a claim
to Western Community under its policy. R., p. 77-78. Villa Highlands asserted that Western
Community refused to negotiate the claim in good faith and refused to pay the full amount of the
claim. R., p. 78-79. Further, Villa Highlands claimed that Western Community's actions deprived it
of the full benefits of the Policy. R., p. 81.
However, the parties entered into a Stipulation on January 17, 2008 (Appendix A), whereby
the parties stipulated to both the value of the building on the date of completion and the value of the
loss. The clear effect of the Stipulation was that there was no longer any dispute between the parties
as to whether Western Community had paid the claim under the dictates of the Policy. Further, the
nature of the Stipulation confirmed that the $3,127,207 paid by Western Community for the loss
fully satisfied its burden under the Policy. Villa Highlands had clearly changed its focus in the
litigation to whether its underinsurance of the building was caused by faulty advice provided by Mr.
Zimney as to how much insurance Villa Highlands should have requested when it purchased the
Policy.
The fact that Western Community's loss payment obligations were no longer a part of the suit
was reflected in the Second Amended Complaint filed by Villa Highlands on January 8, 2008. R., p.
170. Under the Second Amended Complaint, Villa Highlands voluntarily dismissed their claims for
bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation and breach of a contract directly with Western
Community and thus naITowed the nature of the claims in this case. Villa Highlands asserted that its
insurance agent, Dale Zimney, was negligent and breached his contract with Villa Highlands by
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failing to ensure that it adequately insured the Project and failing to procure full and complete
coverage for the building. R., pp. 171-175. In other words, Villa Highlands asse11ed that the
building was inadequately insured and it was unable to secure full payment for its loss under the
Policy due to bad advice given by its insurance agent, Dale Zimney. Villa Highlands also asserted in
the Second Amended Complaint that Mr. Zimney's tort and contractual liability was imputed to
Western Community under agency theory.
Under Count Four of the Second Amended Complaint, Villa Highlands asserted that Mr.
Zimney had a contract with Western Community authorizing him to sell its insurance policies and
products to consumers.

R., p. 176, q[ 23.

Further, Villa Highlands claimed that Western

Community's conduct and actions gave rise to Mr. Zimney having apparent authority to bind
Western Community for representations made by Zimney to Villa Highlands. R., p. 177, 'j[ 25.
Finally, Villa Highlands charged that, based upon Zimney's apparent authority, Western Community
was bound by his representations concerning the subject policy. R., p. 177, q[ 27. While this
particular allegation mentions the term "breach of contract," its use in 'j[ 27 clearly refers to the
alleged contract formed by Zimney' s representations under Count One of the Second Amended
Complaint and not the insurance policy itself. As fu11her evidence of the intent of Count Four, a
similar vicarious liability claim was also stated in tort under Count Five of the Second Amended
Complaint. This claim ultimately was the only claim asserted at trial against Western Community by
Villa Highlands.
While Villa Highlands utilizes a few words or select phrases of Count Four to support an
argument that it sets forth a direct breach of contract claim against Western Community, the claim,
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when read in entirety, clearly outlines a vicarious liability claim in contract, similar in manner to the
vicarious liability in tort claim asserted under Count Five.
Western Community filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on March 3, 2008 with regard
to Count 4 of the Second Amended Complaint on the basis that there were no facts evidencing a
contract between Villa Highlands and Dale Zimney upon which to assert vicarious liability against
Western Community and that there were no facts in the record upon which to assert the application
of agency theory in this case. COE Exh. 10. Thus, it was certainly Western Community's
understanding that Count 4 reflected a vicarious liability claim. Villa Highlands' summary judgment
motion, filed February 29, 2008, also evidenced its intent with regard to the scope of the litigation.

COE Exh. 5. In that Motion, Villa Highlands attempted to utilize the declaratory relief cause of
action to procure a ruling, not that Western Community breached the insurance contract, but that the
Policy was ambiguous and contained unconscionable provisions and, therefore, the underinsurance
provision should not be applied to reduce its loss recovery in this matter. Id.
However, when the firm Davison Copple withdrew from the representation of Villa
Highlands and Perkins Coie undertook to continue to prosecute the claim on Villa Highlands' behalf,
the litigation strategy dramatically shifted. Villa Highlands immediately attempted to unwind the
prior Stipulation of the parties related to the value of the building on the date of completion. Given
that concern, Villa Highlands had the opportunity to simply let the appraisal process run its course,
which process was designed to allow each side to present their respective cases to a neutral third
party. Instead, Villa Highlands sought to unwind the Second Amended Complaint and litigate the
case based on the original breach of contract claim asserted in the earlier Amended Complaint.
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Western Community learned of this shift in Villa Highlands' litigation position during the summary
judgment hearing conducted on April 9, 2008.
Of course, by the time Perkins Coie entered the case, the time for amending pleadings had
long passed and counsel was under the duty to prosecute the action in accordance with the pleadings
in front of the Court. However, this did not stop counsel for Villa Highlands from attempting, a
mere month before trial, to once again greatly expand the scope of the litigation. New counsel for
Villa Highlands was obviously not pleased with the litigation strategy of prior counsel and may have
determined that a better strategy would have been to pursue the breach of contract claim rather than
attacking the specific language of the Policy under the auspices of a declaratory judgment action.
Thus, counsel attempted to read a direct breach of contract action into Count Four where such a
claim was clearly not contemplated by the language of the Second Amended Complaint.
The District Court's determination that Count Four did not state a direct breach of contract
claim against Western Community was not limited to a review of the language of Count Four, as
Villa Highlands would suggest. Rather, the decision was made in the context of the litigation history
in the case. That history clearly revealed that Villa Highlands had affirmatively chosen to abandon
its direct breach of contract claim in the Amended Complaint in favor of a vicarious liability claim.
Therefore, the Court was able to not only determine the language of the Second Amended Complaint
but also Villa Highlands' intent in drafting Count 4 in the Second Amended Complaint.
The Court's decision in this regard was not only intended to fairly hold Villa Highlands to its
own amended pleadings, but also to prevent the expansion of legal issues and factual discovery when
the parties were set to try the case in less than one month. A review of the relevant litigation history
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reveals that, from the time Villa Highlands executed the Stipulation at issue until the time of Perkins
Coie's involvement in the case, Villa Highlands never undertook any efforts to procure discovery
regarding a direct breach of contract claim against Western Community or otherwise prepare such a
claim for trial. However, once Perkins Coie undertook its representation of Villa Highlands, its
entire litigation strategy shifted and Villa Highlands, for the first time, endeavored to take
depositions of Western Community's agents and employees to establish a factual basis for a breach
of contract claim and also to assert the entitlement to consequential damages under a breach of
contract claim. See COE 33 ("Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel"); COE 35
("Memorandum in Support of Western Community's Motion for Protective Order"); Tr., April 17,
2008; Tr., April 28, 2008.
Therefore, Western Community also asserts that the District Court's decision that Count Four
did not allege a direct breach of contract claim against it was a decision based on the sound
discretion of the Court not to allow Villa Highlands to revive claims that it had previously
voluntarily abandoned, especially since the parties were on the eve of trial and voluminous new
discovery would be required to litigate such a claim.

It should also be emphasized that as the procedural history of this case clearly demonstrates,
the parties were continuing to work through the appraisal process specified under the Policy during
the pendency of the litigation. The appraisal process was intended to determine whether the values
utilized by Western Community in paying the loss (i.e., the value of the building on the date of
completion) were appropriate. If Villa Highlands' appraiser disagreed with the values utilized by
Western Community's appraiser, the Policy clearly required that the parties choose an umpire, who
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would make the final determination of which appraisal was appropriate. Policy, E.2., p. 4. The
appraisal process was finally completed (once Villa Highlands was ordered by the Court to fully
participate in the appraisal) just before trial. Thus, Western Community asserts that there was never
a viable breach of contract claim against it either at the time of the filing of the First or Second
Amended Complaint since its duties with regard to loss payment could not be judicially determined
unti I the parties had completed the appraisal process.
Ultimately, the fact that Villa Highlands was not able to proceed at trial based on a direct
breach of contract claim under Count 4 was an outcome of its own making, not the error of the
Court. The Court merely refused Villa Highlands' eve of trial request to completely change the
nature and direction of the litigation and revive claims previously abandoned.

B.

The Court Appropriately Dismissed Count Six of the Second Amended Complaint since
it was Rendered Moot at the Time of Trial and Villa Highlands Failed to Prosecute the
Claim Prior to the Close of Trial
Villa Highlands contends that the District Court erred in dismissing Count Six of the Second

Amended Complaint, (which was its declaratory judgment claim). Under that claim, Villa Highlands
asserted that Western Community applied the "Need for Adequate Insurance" provision under the
Policy to reduce the amount of the loss against the policy limits and requested that the Court interpret
the Policy and application of the provision in this case. R., p. 179. Once again, that provision
provided, in pertinent part:
We will not pay a greater share of any loss than the proportion that
the Limit of Insurance bears to the value on the date of completion of
the building described in the Declarations.
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Policy, F.2., p. 6. After the trial was completed, Villa Highlands requested that the Court declare the

relative rights and obligations of the parties under the Policy and determine that it was entitled to the
payment of the full amount of its claim pursuant to the Policy without reduction or offset. R., p. 179.
Finally, Villa Highlands sought a ruling that any purported underinsurance was caused by Zimney's
apparent authority with Western Community. Id.
Western Community filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with regard to Count Six on the
basis that the insurance policy was unambiguous, should be applied according to its terms and that
the Stipulation between the parties (Appendix A), which ended the dispute regarding the value of the
building on completion and the value of the loss, rendered the declaratory judgment action moot
COE 10.

After oral argument,, the Cou11 declared that the term "value" in paragraph F2 of the Policy
unambiguously meant "actual cash value," which was to be determined by replacement costs, given
that the building was new. Tr., April 9, 2009, p. 66. The Court did not make a determination as to
the proper date to utilize for valuing the building because the parties agreed on using the date of
completion. Id., pp. 81-85. Further, the Court did not rule as to which costs should be included or
excluded in the appraisal to determine the value of the building because counsel for Vi Ila Highlands
stated the issue was something the parties could work out during the appraisal process. Id., pp. 7172.
Also, during the April 9 th summary judgment hearing, the Court ordered Villa Highlands to
cooperate in the appraisal process under the Policy and noted that, under the appraisal process set
forth by the Policy, both Villa Highlands and Western Community were to procure independent
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appraisals and, in the event the two appraisals did not match, to then submit both appraisals to an
independent umpire, who would make a decision as to which appraisal should be utilized to
determine the value. Id., pp. 73-76. Importantly, the Court interpreted the insurance Policy in a
manner such that, the umpire's decision, once issued, would be final, and nothing would be left for
the court or jury to decide. Id., p. 75.
Additional hearings were held before the Court on other issues in the case on April 16 and
17, 2008. During both hearings, the Court referenced its summary judgment rulings with respect to
Count Six on several occasions and noted that the contract interpretation portions of the claim had
been fully determined. See, e.g., Tr., April 16, 2008, pp. 56-58; Tr., April 17, 2008, p. 2. Villa
Highlands did not submit any other motion or make any request that the Court make any further
ruling as to Villa Highlands' rights and obligations under the terms of the contract during either
hearing.
An important part of the litigation history not set forth by Villa Highlands on appeal is the
fact that the Cou11 further addressed the declaratory judgment action during an April 28, 2008
hearing. In that hearing, the Court expressed its understanding that the declaratory judgment action
would be concluded once the parties either: (I) obtained two matching appraisals, or (2) had an
umpire determine the "value" of the building on the date of completion for the purpose of
determining the amount Western Community owed under the Policy. Tr., April 28, 2008, p. 13.
Villa Highlands never raised any objection or argument with the court's understanding of the
appraisal process or the binding nature of the umpire's decision.
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On April 29, 2008, the Court entered an order partially dismissing Count Six, finding that
the insurance contract was unambiguous. R., p. 282. However, with regard to the portion of the
declaratory action requesting that Western Community pay the entirety of Villa Highlands' claimed
loss without any reduction, the Court noted that this determination would be based on the completion
of the appraisal process, then underway. R., p. 282.
On May 1, 2008, Villa Highlands and Western Community submitted their respective
appraisals to an umpire. Affidavit of Cynthia Yee- Wallace in Support of Motion for Relieffrom
Judgment (included with materials under Appellant's Second Motion to Augment Record). Villa
Highlands submitted an appraisal completed by Integra in September 2006. Id., Exh. T. Western
Community submitted an appraisal completed by Mountain States on April 30, 2008. Id., Exh. N &
U. On May 2, 2008, the umpire asked the parties for a definition of the term "cash value." Id., Exh.
V. The parties sent the umpire a letter stating that the term was defined as "actual cash value," that it
did not include certain types of costs and that the umpire should refer to pages 68-69 of the April 9,
2008 hearing transcript for the court's ruling as to the term "value." Id., Exh. W.
On May 4, 2008, one day before the trial began, the umpire sent a letter to the parties with
his finding that the Mountain States appraisal submitted by Western Community was more reliable.

Id., Exh. Y. That appraisal established that the value of the building on the date of completion was
$8.3 million and, therefore, confirmed that Villa Highlands was underinsured under the Policy. Id.,
Exh. U. Therefore, the result of the umpire's decision was a finding that Western Community had
properly calculated and paid the loss in accordance with its obligations under the Policy.
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Once again, during a hearing on the morning of trial, counsel for Villa Highlands stated that
Villa Highlands did not plan on attacking the appraisal process at trial. Villa Highlands also
stipulated to the amount of damages it would be seeking at trial, the approximate $840,000
difference between the value of the loss and the amount Western Community paid under the Policy
due to the application of the "need for adequate insurance" provision. See Order on Western

Community's First Motion in Limine, ~[ 5 (attached with materials pursuant to Appellant's Second
Motion to Augment the Record); Tr., May 5, 2008, pp. 9-11.
The fact that counsel for Villa Highlands agreed before trial that the damages it would be
seeking at trial were limited to the $840,000 difference described above, evidences that Villa
Highlands agreed with the outcome of the appraisal. Otherwise, the logical step for Villa Highlands
to have taken was to contest the appraisal process prior to the jury hearing the case. After all, the
entire point of the appraisal process was to establish the amount of damages Villa Highlands could
seek from the jury. (See discussion, pp. 24-25 supra).
The case was tried before a jury from May 5, 2008 through May 13, 2008. No issues under
Count Six were submitted to the jury. The jury awarded no damages to Villa Highlands. Prior to the
close of trial, Villa Highlands never asserted, in motion form or otherwise, that the Court needed to
declare anything further with regard to the rights and obligations of the parties under the insurance
contract pursuant to Count Six of the Second Amended Complaint. After the trial was concluded,
Western Community submitted a proposed Judgment dismissing all claims against it. R., p. 296.
Villa Highlands objected to the proposed Judgment on May 22, 2008 on the basis that not all claims
had been adjudicated. R., p. 293. However, Villa Highlands did not specifically reference the claim
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for declaratory relief in its motion. On May 27, 2008, the court singed the proposed Judgment,
ordering that all claims against Western Community, including the claim for declaratory relief, be
dismissed with prejudice based on the understanding that no controversy remained.
In its Motion for Relief from Judgment, filed July 8, 2008, Villa Highlands argued for the
first time that the Mountain States appraisal chosen by the umpire as the more reliable appraisal,
included arguably uninsurable items not covered by the Policy, resulting in the appraisal coming in
higher than appropriate. In addition, Villa Highlands asserted that the Supplemental Addendum to
the appraisal contained numerous errors and mistakes. Villa Highlands requested that the court set
aside the umpire's findings because they were not in compliance with the te1ms of the Policy and
because the umpire's Appraisal Review was based on several errors and mistakes.
In its August 26, 2008 Order on Villa Highlands' Motion for Relief from Judgment ("Order,
re: Relief from Judgment"), the Court found that a justiciable controversy did not exist with regard to
the declaratory judgment action at the conclusion of trial. Further, the Court clarified that the intent
of its April 28, 2008 ruling during the hearing regarding the declaratory action was to require the
completion of the appraisal process required by the Policy and, once completed, that there would be
no further issues to be determined under Count Six. See Appendix B, Order, re: Relief from
Judgment, p. 7. Further, the Court found:
Despite the fact that the declaratory action was not dismissed until
after the trial and a year and a half after filing, Villa Highlands never
made the court aware of any remaining controversy that needed to be
decided by the court. Although Villa Highlands reserved the right to
contest the appraisal process on appeal, at no point between the
issuance of Mountain States' revised appraisal on April 30, the
umpire's decision on May 4, and the court's order on May 27 did
Villa Highlands bring any motion before the court asking the court to
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vacate the umpire's decision and to declare what types of costs may
be appropriately included in the appraisal under the terms of the
insurance policy. Instead of bringing a motion asking the court to
grant the relief requested under the declaratory action by declaring the
appraisal process or umpire's decision invalid, Villa Highlands
stipulated to the damages sought at trial, thereby rendering the
appraisal process moot since the end result of the appraisal process
would otherwise have been the basis for determining damages. On
May 22, Villa Highlands did object to Western Community's
proposed judgment on the grounds "that not all claims pending
against Western Community have been dismissed with prejudice,"
but Villa Highlands did not explain what claims or controversies
remained for the court to decide.

Id., p. 7. Thus, the District Court concluded that there was no valid basis to reconsider the Judgment
previously entered and allow Villa Highlands to continue to litigate issues under the declaratory
relief claim.

1.

Villa Highlands did not Preserve any Issues with respect to the Appraisal
Process for Trial

Villa Highlands spends a great deal of its briefing outlining its criticism of the appraisal
process, the umpire's decision and Western Community's alleged representations and/or positions
taken during the appraisal process. However, all of this background information ignores the plain
fact that Villa Highlands is attempting to assert an issue on appeal that was never raised before the
trial court. It is fundamental that an issue not raised dming the trial will not be considered by Idaho's
appellate courts when raised for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Doe, 123 Idaho 370, 371,
848 P.2d 428,429 (1993).
Western Community would note that it was forced to procure an order of the District Court
just to get Villa Highlands to undertake its duty under the policy to participate in the appraisal
process. Villa Highlands' delay and failure to abide by its contractual obligations meant that the
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appraisal process was not able to be completed until just before trial. The Western Community
appraisal of the value of the building on the date of completion submitted to the umpire came in
higher than the value originally utilized by Western Community when it paid the loss. The umpire
agreed that Western Community's appraisal of the value of the building on the date of completion
was more accurate and/or reliable. While Western Community could have rightfully utilized the
umpire's decision to further reduce Villa Highlands' loss payment under the Policy (as the result of
the appraisal process confirmed that Villa Highlands was actually even more underinsured than
contemplated by Western Community when the claim was originally adjusted), the parties agreed to
utilize the building valuation figure originally determined by Western Community, which meant that
the damages Villa Highlands would be asserting at trial would be set at approximately $840,000.
Tr., May 5, 2008, pp. 9-11.

When the parties convened on the first day of trial and were arguing and discussing the
various issues raised by motions in Ii mine before the Court, Villa Highlands had a clear opportunity
to assert a motion contesting the validity of the appraisal process or the umpire's decision. Rather
than utilizing that opportunity, Villa Highlands represented in open court that it was not contesting
the outcome of the appraisal process at trial and then stipulated to the amount they would be seeking
for damages at trial. Tr., May 5, 2008, pp. 7, 9-11, 12-13, 18-19, 21-23.
Villa Highlands' stipulation in this regard was especially important, since the object of the
appraisal process was the determination of the value of Villa Highlands' insurance claim and, thus,
the amount of damages Villa Highlands would be presenting to the jury. As noted above, the final
application of the "need for adequate insurance" provision of the Policy could not be addressed until
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the value of the building on the date of completion had been determined. Thus, the issue of Villa
Highlands' damages was not even ripe to be heard in front of the jury until the appraisal process was
complete and the parties had agreed with respect to the values utilized by Western Community in
paying the loss at issue.
Ultimately, at no time before the close of the trial did Villa Highlands ever present a motion
to the Court or otherwise make any argument contesting the validity of the appraisal process or the
umpire's decision, in keeping with the statement by Villa Highlands' counsel that they were not
"attacking" the appraisal process.
Moreover, Villa Highlands has no excuse for not asserting any motion before the court
contesting or seeking judicial clarification regarding the proper elements to be included in the
appraisal process under the Policy prior to the close of trial. After all, Villa Highlands asserted its
claim for declaratory relief in December 2006, eighteen months prior to trial. In the final analysis,
Villa Highlands waived any right to assert any triable issue with regard to the appraisal process when
it entered its stipulation regarding damages on the first day of trial and failed to present any motion
to the Court regarding the appraisal process prior to the close of trial.

2.

Any Issues Regarding the Appraisal Process were Rendered Moot by the Jury's
Decision

Once again, the import of Villa Highlands' participation in the appraisal process under the
Policy was to reach a final determination regarding Western Community's loss payment obligations
under the Policy. In fact, Western Community submits that the real importance behind the District
Court's order that the appraisal be completed prior to trial was the fact that the extent of Villa
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Highlands' damage claims for trial could not be determined until all of the values that went into the
underinsurance calculation had been fixed.
Since the stipulated amount of Villa Highlands' loss was $3,967,157 (per agreement of
counsel) and Western Community paid $3,127,207 of that loss (due to the application of the "need
for adequate insurance" provision), the amount of Villa Highlands' damage claim at trial was
$839,950. However, the jury found that Villa Highlands was not entitled to any damages at trial.
Therefore, regardless of Villa Highlands' arguments regarding what should or should not have been
included in the appraisal process or the con-ectness of the umpire's decision, its damage claims have
already been fully adjudicated with the jury finding that Villa Highlands was not entitled to damages,
a result Villa Highlands does not appeal. Any further issues with the appraisal have now been
rendered moot.

3.

Villa Highlands is not Entitled to Challenge the Appraisal Process under the
Policy

Villa Highlands also asserts that it was entitled to seek a determination from the District
Court that the umpire's decision under the appraisal process should be set aside. However, none of
the language in the Policy itself provides a basis for an insured to challenge the umpire's decision.
Under the procedure set forth under the Policy, the umpire's decision is final and "binding." Villa
Highlands never raised an issue prior to the close of trial that the provisions of the Policy regarding
the appraisal process were ambiguous, violated any provision of Idaho law or were against public
policy.
Villa Highlands argues that there is legal authority supporting the proposition that an
appraisal award may be judicially challenged. See, e.g., Central Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty &
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Surety Co., 466 N.W.2d 257, 260 (Iowa 1991); Wells v. American States Preferred Ins. Co., 919
S.W.2d 679, 683 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996). However, in both of these cases, the issue regarding the
binding effect of an umpire's decision was the central case and controversy asserted in the action and
the parties to both suits specifically requested that the court resolve certain issues regarding the
appraisal process of umpire's decisions.
In this case, Villa Highlands neither asserted a declaratory judgment action nor raised any
motion asking the Court to judicially determine which elements were to be included in the appraisal
process or to vacate the umpire's decision prior to the close of trial and the court's dismissal of the
declaratory action. Once again, Villa Highlands' claim for declaratory relief merely requested that the
Court determine its rights and obligations under the insurance contract.

The court made this

determination by declaring that the term "value" under the Policy was defined as "actual cash value"
and by declaring that the parties were to engage in and complete the appraisal process.
At no time prior to the Court's dismissal of the declaratory relief claim did Villa Highlands
inform the Comt that it was seeking the Court's further declaration that the appraisal process or
umpire's decision were flawed and should be set aside. As set forth above, the District Court stated
its understanding that the umpire's decision would be final and binding and would result in the
conclusion of the declaratory judgment action. Tr., April 9, 2008, p. 75. Villa Highlands never
objected to the Court's reasoning and certainly did not inform the Court that there were remaining
issues or controversies to be decided under the declaratory judgment action prior to the close of trial.
Finally, Western Community notes that it is patently clear as to why Villa Highlands waited
until its motion for relief from judgment to ask the District Cou1t, for the first time, to vacate the
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umpire's decision. It had affirmatively chosen to litigate its entitlement to the $840,000 difference
between the loss and the amount paid by Western Community for the claim at trial under the argument
that it was underinsured was due to Mr. Zimney's negligence, for which Western Community was
vicariously liable. After putting all of its apples in this basket and losing at trial, Villa Highlands
sought once again to revise its litigation strategy in an effort to recover money from Western
Community that it was not able to recover at trial.
As the litigation history presented above clearly demonstrates, Villa Highlands has
consistently demonstrated a proclivity for utilizing "convictions of convenience," which involved
shifting its legal theories and arguments during the course of this proceeding to suit its desires. Its
arguments on appeal regarding Count Six of the Second Amended Complaint comprise yet another
attempt to change positions when not satisfied with its previous litigation strategy or the judicial
outcome of that strategy. Western Community asserts that this Comt should not provide an avenue for
Vi Ila Highlands to extend these proceedings merely because it was unsuccessful procuring the remedy
it specifically sought at trial.

C.

The Trial Court Properly Utilized its Discretion in Denying Villa Highlands'
Motion to Vacate the Trial and/or Extend Deadlines
Villa Highlands asserts that the circumstances and timing of Davison Copple's withdrawal

from the case wan-anted the District Court vacating the trial and extending the deadlines of the case.
Villa Highlands' counsel argues that it was prejudiced in having insufficient time to prepare a
complex case for trial due to the District Court's refusal to vacate the trial date and extend several
deadlines. Further, Villa Highlands claims that the Court allowed proceedings to continue during the

36

20 day time period following the entry of its order allowing withdrawal of counsel in violation of
Rule ll(b)(3).
Idaho appellate courts review a district court's denial of a motion to vacate trial under an
abuse of discretion standard, Gubler v, Boe, 120 Idaho 294,296,815 P.2d 1034, 1036 (1991), and
will analyze if the trial court knew it had the discretion, acted within the parameters provided to it
and demonstrated an exercise of reason. Brady v. City of Homedale, 130 Idaho 569, 572, 944 P.2d
704, 707 ( 1997) (quoting Lankford v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 126 Idaho 187, 188-89, 879 P.2d 1120,
1121-22 (1994)).
When the District Court entertained Davison Copple's Motion to Withdraw on March 12,
2008, the Court noted that, if the trial were to be re-set in the matter, it would take at least one year
before the case could be tried, a result that was unfair to the Defendants, who had already been
engaged in the defense of the matter for eighteen months. Tr., March 12, 2008, p. 4. The District
Court immediately recognized the difficulty in allowing withdrawal close to trial. Id., pp. 4-5. The
court also noted recognized that the withdrawal of Davison Copple from the case was due to
circumstances of Villa Highlands' own making, i.e., Bill Hodges simply wanted to part ways with his
own attorneys in the case. Id., pp. 5-6.
Due to the fact that Villa Highlands' response to Western Community's Motion for Summary
Judgment would be due during the twenty day period after the Court entered the order on the Motion
th

to Withdraw, it extended the hearing date on summary judgment motion from March 26 to April
9 th Id., pp. 6-7. During the hearing, the Court also allowed the paities to extend the expert
discovery deadline until April 18 th Id., pp. 10-11.
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It appears that Villa Highlands is claiming that the extensions of the summary judgment
hearing date and expert discovery deadlines violated the provisions of Rule l l(b)(3) whereby no
proceedings should occur in a case during the twenty day period of time in which the newly
unrepresented party may seek to obtain new counsel or enter an appearance on its own behalf.
However, it is clear that the Court's actions, which occurred during the hearing on the Motion to
Withdraw and not during the twenty day period after the signed order was issued, were not in
violation of Rule 11 (b)(3). In fact, the Court's ruling inured to Villa Highlands' benefit, ensuring
that new counsel for Villa Highlands would have an opportunity to file a response to the pending
summary judgment motion and have time to take expert depositions prior to trial.
Further, the court properly exercised its discretion in denying Perkins Coie's Motion to
Vacate, when presented during the April 9, 2008 hearing. Counsel's primary concern with regard to
the Motion to Vacate was the ability to complete witness and expert depositions. Tr., April 9, 2008,
pp. 126-127. The court responded to this concern by granting an additional week to complete
discovery, until April 25 th Id., pp. 128-129, 133-134. The court also noted that it would be willing
to hear motions in Ii mine all the way up to the morning of trial. Id., p. 134.
Clearly, the circumstances which allegedly required the remedy of vacating the trial were of
Villa Highlands' own making rather than reasonable necessity. The trial comt was merely unwilling
to force the Defendants to wait another year to try the case when the only reason for the delay was
because Mr. Hodges of Villa Highlands was not happy with Davison Copple's representation and
wanted to procure new counsel one month before trial. Further, as is clear from Perkins Coie's
argument during the April 9 th summary judgment hearing, the renewed Motion to Vacate was really
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an attempt by counsel to undo the Second Amended Complaint and completely re-start the litigation
in the manner new counsel wanted it framed and litigated.
Therefore, the Court's decision did not merely reflect a determination that a trial delay of one
year or more would be unfair and prejudicial to the Defendants, but also that Villa Highlands was not
entitled to utilize the motion as a means to "re-start" the litigation and take it into a new direction
when the parties were already in the last stages of preparing for trial based on the status of the
pleadings at the time Davison Copple withdrew from the case.

D.

Villa Highlands' Argument Regarding its Entitlement to Present Evidence of
Consequential Damages at Trial has been Rendered Moot
Villa Highlands argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to allow it to

introduce evidence regarding its entitlement to consequential damages at trial. Idaho appellate courts
review a trial court's decisions admitting or excluding evidence under the abuse of discretion
standard." Morris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho 138,144,937 P.2d 1212, 1218 (1997). An incoITect
ruling only warrants a new trial if the error affected a substantial right of a party. Id. (citing l.R.C.P.
61; l.R.E. 103).

The issue of Villa Highlands' right to present evidence of consequential damages at trial was
discussed at length during hearings before the District Court on April 17, 2008 (Tr., April 17, 2008,
pp. 141-174, continued hearing on Motions for Summary Judgment), on April 28, 2008 (Tr., April
28, 2008, pp. 179-194, hearing on Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider), and on May 5, 2008 (Tr., May

5, 2008, pp. 31-42, hearing on Western Community's Motion in Limine). Ultimately, the Court
refused to allow Villa Highlands to present this evidence at trial because it was not timely disclosed
to Defendants under the Court's scheduling order.
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Western Community asserts that the District Court properly refused this item of evidence,
especially since Villa Highlands never provided a response to Western Community's discovery
requests regarding evidence in support of consequential damages. Furthermore, the claim to
consequential damages ran contrary to Bill Hodges' own deposition testimony where he indicated
that the damages being sought in the matter were limited to the $840,000 difference between the
amount of the claim and the amount Villa Highlands was paid by Western Community. Tr., April
16, 2008, pp. 29-32.
Rather than laying out the full procedural history regarding the consequential damages issue
in the context of this briefing, Western Community would note that this issue may be resolved on a
rather simple basis. Since Villa Highlands' tort and contract claims were fully tried before a jury and
the jury dete1mined that Villa Highlands was not entitled to any damages in this matter, any alleged
e1Tor in the District Court's decision not to allow evidence of consequential damages is not material
enough to wan-ant reversal and a new trial. The evidence regarding consequential damages would
not have gone to the liability issues decided by the jury. Thus, presentation of this evidence would
not have affected the ultimate outcome of the trial. The issue of whether Villa Highlands should
have been able to present consequential damage evidence at trial has been rendered moot by the
jury's decision and is, therefore, a frivolous issue on appeal.

E.

The District Court Correctly Denied Villa Highlands' Motion to Compel Since there
were no Direct Breach of Contract Claims Asserted against Western Community
Villa Highlands asserts that it was entitled, two weeks prior to the start of trial, to procure

new discovery regarding the underwriting process for its insurance policy and the manner in which
Western Community investigated and adjusted the loss at issue. This issue was initially raised in
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front of the District Court on Villa Highlands' Motion to Compel a 30(b )(6) deposition of Western
Community, the deposition of Clayton Brumett (the claims adjuster who handled Villa Highlands
insurance claim) and Rodney Saetrum (Western Community's attorney who also was involved in
handling the insurance claim). See COE 33 (Plaintiff's Motion to Compel); COE 35 (Memorandum
in Support of Western Community's Motion for Protective Order); COE 36 (Affidavit of Robert A.
Anderson in Support of Motion for Protective Order).
A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to compel will not be disturbed on appeal
unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 141 ldaho 697, 700-01,
116 P.3d 27, 30-1 (2005).
With respect to the issue of Western Community's underwriting process which preceded the
issuance of the Builder's Risk policy at issue, Tr., April 16, 2008, pp. 64-66, Western Community
took the position that it was not relevant to any claims against it under the Second Amended
Complaint (especially since the only remaining claims against it were based on vicarious liability)
and that Villa Highlands was merely attempting to engage in a fishing expedition on the eve of trial
in an attempt to once again shift its litigation strategy. Id., 69-71.
The Court noted to Villa Highlands during the hearing that discovery in the case should have
been long completed. Id., p. 80. The Court allowed Villa Highlands to review the underwriting file
to determine if the file contained any communications between Dale Zimney and Western
Community which may have been relevant to the amount of insurance requested in Villa Highlands'
application. Id., pp. 82-83. However, the Court would not allow Villa Highlands to procure
extensive discovery concerning Western Community's underwriting process, especially since there
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were no claims under the Second Amended Complaint relating to the manner in which Western
Community created the Policy. Id.
Concerning Villa Highlands' request to depose Western Community adjusters and
underwriters in the weeks before trial, See COE 33 (Plaintiff's Motion to Compel), the Court
correctly noted that further discovery of the manner in which Western Community adjusted the claim
was irrelevant since the parties had stipulated to the amount of the loss. Tr., April 16, 2008, p. 91.
Further, the District Court questioned why Villa Highlands did not attempt to depose these
individuals during the previous 16 months the parties had been litigating the case. Id., p. 93.
Ultimately, however, the Court found that the depositions of Western Community's adjusters and
underwriters was not relevant to claims asserted against Western Community and that it appeared
that Villa Highlands was seeking a means to support a bad faith claim that was not at issue in the
case. Id., pp. 94, 100-101.
The District Court clearly acted within its discretion in denying Villa Highlands' eve of trial
attempt to conduct extensive discovery regarding Western Community's underwriting and loss
adjustment process related to Villa Highlands' policy and loss. As the Court noted, Villa Highlands
had the full opportunity to conduct this discovery when there were breach of contract and bad faith
claims pending against Western Community under the Amended Complaint. However, rather than
seeking that discovery, Villa Highlands chose to drop those claims under the Second Amended
Complaint and pursue Western Community on a vicarious liability basis.
The Court's ruling on Villa Highlands' Motion to Compel was merely an attempt to hold
Villa Highlands to its pleadings and prevent it from once again attempting to expend the scope of
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litigation and shift its litigation strategy in the weeks before trial. Therefore, the Court's decision
should be upheld.

IV. CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Western Community respectfully request that this Court
affirm the District Court's various rulings at issue in this appeal and grant Western Community its
attorney fees and costs incurred in responding to this appeal.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

this/l?:l!.::f

April, 2009.

rt A. Anderson, Oft
Attorneys for Respondents

43

SERVICE

tJ

y of April, 2009, I served a true and correct copy of
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on
the foregoing RESPONDENTS' BRIE1~y delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of
record, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:

[l
!>{
[l

Richard C. Boardman
Cynthia Yee-Wallace
PERKINS COIE LLP
251 East Front Street, Suite 400
P.O. Box 737
Boise, ID 83701

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

[ ]

,.

•

APPENDIX
A

09/08/2008 10:08 FTP

• Robert Anderson

ANDERSON,JULIAN & HULL

@001/010

FILED
NO.
Fll.EDA.M,

¢2:

PM7;,?

AUG 26 2008

IN TiiE DISTRICT COURT OFTiiE FOURTH JUDIC1AL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

VILLA HIGHLANDS, U..C, an Idaho
)
limited liability company,
----·---· _) _______________ -----·. - ......,... -----)
Case No. CV OC 0621175
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
)

vs.

DECISION AND ORDER ON
PLAJNTIFFS MOTION FOR
RELffiF FROM JUDGMENT

WESTERN COMMUNITY INSURANCE )
CO., an Idaho limited liability company, )
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE)
COMPANY OF IDAHO, an Idaho
)
Corporation; DALEE, ZIMNEY; and
)
DOES 1-V,

)

Defendants.

)
)
)

Before the court for decision is Plaintiff's Rule 60(b)(6) Motion For Relief From

on

l---·~J~~~~~~- ~~~-:as _h~~~ on-~~s motion
~~~st 20, _200~: Ric~ard Bo!11°dman and
'
Cynthia L. Yee-Wallace appeared on behalf of plaintiff, with Mr. Boardman arguing. Roben
Anderson appeared and argued on behalf of Defendant Western Community Insurance, Co.
Karen Sheehan appeared on behalf of defendant Dale E. Zimney.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:

This case arose out of a builder's risk insurance policy purchased by Plaintiff Villa
Highlands to cover the Villa Highlands' building during construction, In purchasing the policy,
Villa Highlands dealt with Dale Zimney (Zimney), an insurance agent for Western Community
Insurance Company (Western Community) and Farm Bureau Jnsunmce Company (Farm
Bureau). The policy itself was issued by Western Community. Unfortunately, midway through
l
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construction, the building caught fire and was destroyed, During the adjustment process, it was
discovered that Villa Highlands may have been under-insured, triggering a redUction in benefits
for the loss Villa Highlands suffered. In response to this, Villa Highlands, on November 13,

2006, filed this lawsuit requesting damages and also seeking declaratory relief-asking the court
to determine the rights of the parties under the written insurance contract.
More than a year later, in December 2007, Western Community motioned the court to
compel appraisal as contemplated under the insurance contract. In February and March of 2008,

all parties moved for summary judgment.
On April 9, 2008, the court, in a ruling from the bench, denied Villa Highlands' motion
for summary judgment, graritecl Ziiiiney"nnoticill'"only as T1nlle bi"elll:n"61a specfal relatiiinsfiip
claim, and granted Western Community and Farm Bureau's motion only to the extent of
dismissing Fann Bureau as a defendant. All other claims, including the request for declaratory
relief, remained. In regard to Western Community's motion to compel apPraisal, the court told
both parties that they needed to quickly get their appraisals and complete the appraisal process
before trial. (Hr'g Tr. 75-76, Apr. 9, 2008.)
During the April 9th hearing, the court declared that the term "value" in paragraph f.2 of
the policy unambiguously meant "actual cash value,'' which was to be determined by
replacement costs, (Hr'g Tr. 66.) The court did not decide the date to use for valuing the property
because the parties had already agreed on using the date of completion and recognized that they
were to come to an agreement as to that date. (Hr'g Tr, 81-85.) In addition, the court did not
decide the issue of what costs should be included or excluded to determine the value because
counsel for Villa Highlands stated that the issue was something for the parties to work out. 1
------ - iHr'gTr; 71-72.y-·-- · ---- - . --·-- - - ---- - -- ---- - .. . .
..... -··.
Although not raised before the April 9th hearing, Villa Highlands indicated that it was
not clear as to how the appraisal process worked, so the parties discussed the issue with the court
at that time. The court concluded that, under the tenns of the contract, both the insured and the
insurance company were to get independent appraisals and, in the event that the appraisals did
not match, to then submit those appraisals to an independent umpire to make a decision as to
which appraisal detennines the value. (Hr' g Tr. 73-76, Apr. 9, 2008.) As the court interpreted the

1

Mr. Boardman informed the court, "We then move on ro still some thorny issu~ about what goes into an appraisal.
The problem with these appraisals that have already been done, Judge is they include, as I call them, uninsurable
items but I think that is for us to work out with whom ever." The coun responded, ''Well you're going to have IO get
it done ~fore the trial. I'm not going to reset your trial,"

2
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contract, the umpire's decision, once issued, would be final, and nothing would be left for the
court, or a jury, to decide. (Hr'g Tr. 75, Apr, 9, 2008.)
In additional hearings on April 16 and 17, 2008, the court noted that the claim for
declaratory action was not completely gone but was gone to the extent of the court's
detennination that "the value on the date of completion is the actual c8Sh value." (Hr'g Tr. 56,
58, Apr. 16, 2008; Hr' g Tr. 2, Apr, 17, 2008.) The court concluded, "Yilla Highlands requested

the court to determine the right to liabilities of the parties in that count, and ... the court has
looked at how the contract is to be interpreted and those decisions have been made relative to the

Dec action." (Hr'g Tr. 2, Apr. 17, 2008.) Villa Highlands did not ask the court to make any
further ruling as to Villa Highlands' rights ano obligaticiiik iiiider t1ie terms oftbe contract prior
to the dismissal of the declaratory action.
Then during a hearing on April 28, 2008, the court stated its understanding that the
declaratory action would go away once the parties obtained two matching appraisals or had an
umpire determine the "value" for the purpose of calculating the amount the insurance company
owed Neither party objected to this understanding. (Hr' g Tr. 13, April 28, 2008.) The court
stated, "I understand the Dec action should go away once you get the umpire to detennine-or
(you get] two appraisals [that match]. Then we know what that amount [of damages] is." (Hr'g

n. 13, Apr. 28, 2008.) Villa Highlands did not make any objection to the court's understanding
of the appraisal process or the binding nature of the umpire's decision.
On April 29, 2008, the court entered a written order as to its April 9th rulings on the

summary judgment motions. In regard to Plaintiffs claim for declaratory action against Western
Community under Count Six of the Second Amended Complaint, the court held only that the
insurance policy was clear aiiii unambiguous fn itTurms. (Order on Def:Westert'i Community and
Fann Bureau's Mot. Summ. J. 3.) The court did not determine whether Plaintiff was entitled to
relief and stated that whether the claim was to be dismissed was "to be determined after the
appraisals." (ld.)
On May 1, 2008, Villa Highlands and Western submitted their respective appraisals to an
umpire. Villa Highlands submitted the appraisal completed by Integra in September 2006.
Western submitted a modified appraisal, the Supplemental Addendum to Appraisal ~eport,
completed by Mountain States on April 30, 2008. On May 2, 2008, the umpire asked the parties
for a definition of "cash value" and received a Jetter stating that it was "actual cash value," that it
did not include certain types of items, and that the umpire should refer to pages 68-69 of the
April 9th hearing transcript for court's ruling as to the term "value." (Villa Highlands argues that
3
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in agreeing to send the letter, "it was not waiving its right to argue that other items should not be
included in the valuation repotts,")
On May 4, 2008, one day before trial began, the umpire sent a letter to the parties with
his finding that Mountain States appraisal was more reliable. The Mountain States appraisal
established that the value was greater than what Western Community had originally established
the value to be2-affirming that Villa Highlands was in fact underinsured according to the
policy. On May 5, just before trial began, Ms. Yee-Wallace, counsel for Villa Highlands, stated
that her client was "not attacking the appraisal process" at this point or the number (representing
the "value" under clause f.2 of the contract) "for purposes of this trial," She also stated that her
client was not waiving its right to challenge ihe appmisafon appeal. Nevertheiess, the .parties
stipulated to the amount of damages sought al trial, and that stipulation was entered on May 6,
2008. {Order on Def. Western Community's First Mot. in Limine 3,)
The case was tried to a jury from May 5, 2008 through May 13, 2008. The jury awarded
no damages to Villa Highlands, No issues under the declaratory action were submitted to the
jury. On May 27, 2008, the court ordered that all claims, including the claim for declaratory
relief, against Western Community be dismissed with prejudice based on its understanding that
no controversy remained.

PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENTS:

Villa Highlands argues that the court should grant it relief from the order dismissing
count siK of the Amended Complaint because ''the declaratory action was not concluded or fully
detennined." In paragraph thirty-four of the complaint, Villa Highlands asked the court to
declare "the relative rights ancro6Iigafioiis

ofihe"paitfes" under the" insurance poiicy and lo

"detennine that Villa Highlands is entitled to the payment of the full amount due and owing
pursuant ro the Policy without reduction, offset, or reduction in any manner." Villa Highlands
argues that although the Court declared that the term "value" means ''actual cash value," the
court made no other declaration before dismissing the claim.
According to Villa Highlands, the problem is that the parties were not able to reach an
agreement on a more extensive definition of value and exactly what items may be considered as
"replacement costs." Mr. Boardman told the court that he hoped the parties could reach an
agreement, but on the eve of trial, the parties did not agree on how to classify all tyPes of
2

Western originally determined that the value of the building was at least $7.1 million. The modified Mountain
States appraisal detetmined that the value of the building was $8.3 million.
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building costs, Instead, the parties agreed to the exclusion of some costs from being considered
"replacement costs" and infonned the umpire of that which they agreed on.
Villa Highlands argues that the Supplemental Addendum to Appraisal Report, which the
umpire determined to be the more reliable appraisal, included arguably uninsurable items not
covered by the policy, causing the appraisal to result in a higher value than was appropriate.~ In
addition, it argues that the Supplemental Addendum contained significant errors and mistakes. 4
Villa Highlands asks the court to set aside the umpire's findings because the findings of
the umpire, Mr. Langston, are not in compliance with the tenns of the Builder's Risk policy and
because Mr. Langston's Limited Appraisal Review was based on significant mistakes and errors.
In support of this request, Villa Highla:iids uses case law from Texas and Iowa to· argue that the
colllt may overturn an appraisal award in three situations: (1) when the award was made without
authority; (2) when the award was the result of fraud, accident, or mistake; or (3) when the award
was not made in substantial compliance with the tenns of the contract. Wells v, American States

Preferred Ins. Co., 919 S.W. 2d 679,683 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996); see also Central Life Ins. Co. v.
Aema & Surety Co,, 466 N.W.2d 257, 260 (Iowa 1991), (Idaho does not have any case law on
point.)

DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS:

Western Community argues that Villa Highlands' claim for declaratory judgment had
been fully resolved or rendered moot by the time trial commenced because an umpire had made a
final detennination in the appraisal process. In support of this argument, Western Community
points to statements made by the court during the hearings in April demonstrating the
understanding of the court and the pilrtfes that the.declaratory action

was gone to the extent that

'Western Community stated previously that motion sensors, al=, consequential damages, additional security,
contingency funds, construction fences, and the cost of project managers are not covered in the policy and should be
excluded in valuing the building. However, all of these costs were ineluded in the Supplemental Addendum. Other
soft costs were also included in the Supplemental Addendum. Many of the items listed under ugeneral conditions" in
the Petra 2006 Estimate include uninsurable costs such as: labor, surveying, inspection fees, rent.al equipment,
contractor's profit. and architectural fees. Other costs, such as sitework and signage, were included in the Petra 2006
estimate f)Utare expressly not covered by the policy (s"" paragraph A.2.b(3)), These items were originally included
in lhe l'etra 2006 be<:aUJ1e Westem Community asked Villa Highlands to submit the cost to reconstruct the entire
project for purposes of determining the amount of the loss after the fire. The Pob"a 2006 estimate was never intended
to reflect the value of the building for purposes of an underinsurance determination, much like Sames Brown
appraisals were not conducted for S\lch determinations. Western Community simply attached the Petra 2006
Estimate to a spreadsheet and had !heir appraisal sramp it with approval in order to make it qualify as an appraisal
under the policy. Mr, Langsron's findings based on this Addendlllll were improper, and should be vacated.
4
For instance, the Mountain States Appraisal computes valuations U$ing the square footage of the Villa Highlands
lam!, which is 71,308. However, the squill'e footlge of the Villa Hi$hlands building was 62,830. Also, the Mountain
States Appraisal used a completion date of June !, 2007, which is unsuppo~ by any evidence in the record.

s
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the court had made interpretations of the insurance policy and implying that the ac1ion would be
gone when the umpire reached a decision and Villa Highlands was paid accordingly. Before and
during trial, Villa Highlands neither indicated that the declaratory action would survive nor
advanced an argument that it had a right to appeal the umpire's decision. In addition, Villa
Highlands ratified the appraisal process by stipulating to damages. Based on Villa Highlands'
silence and stipulation, Western argues that the com:t's dismissal of the declaratory action was
appropriate.
Western Community also argues that the insurance contract does not give Villa
Highlands a right or opportunity to appeal the umpire's decision and that to give Villa Hig)llands
that opp~rtunity ~ould allow it to make arguments not advanced at trial or ..within the scope of
the pleadings. More specifically, Western Community argues that Villa Highlands' motion is an
attempt to bring a breach of contract claim under a new legal theory.

STANl>ARJ) OF REVIEW;

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) provides that a party may motion the district court
to grant relief from judgment on the grounds that there is any "reason justifying relief from the

operation of the judgment." This catchall provision does not pennit the court to reconsider the
legal basis for its decision, and the moving party may not use it to present newly discovered legal
theories. First Bank & Trust of Idaho v. Parker Bros., Inc., 112 Idaho 30, 32 730 P.2d 950, 952
(1986). Instead, the moving party "must demonstrate unique and compelling circumstances
justifying relief." Matter of Estate of Bagley, 117 Idaho 1091, 1093, 793 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Ct.
App.1990),

ANALYSIS:

The underlying issue is whether it was appropriate for the court to dismiss the declaratory
action upon completion of the trial or whether a controversy over the interpretation of the Policy
remained such that a declaratory judgment needed to be rendered, For a party to obtain
declaratory relief, there must be a justiciable controversY,, Harris v. Cas,ia County, 106 Idaho
513,681 P.2d 988 (1984),
Villa Highlands claims that the declaratory action had not been resolved and was
therefore improperly dismissed. To support this claim, Villa Highlands points to the language in
the April 28, 2008 order wllere the court stated it would later detennine the claim for declaratory
relief and then contrasts that language with the May 27, 2008 order where the court instead
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dismissed the claim. However, the court's intent by the April 28, 2008 order was to require
completion of the appraisal process required by the parties under the contract. Once that was
done, there would be no remaining issues.
Despite the fact that the declaratory action was not dismissed until after the trial and a
year and a half after filing, Villa IDghlMds never made the court aware of any remaining
controversy that needed to be decided by the court, Although Villa IDghlands reserved the right
to contest the appraisal process on appeal, at no point between the issuance of Mountain States
revised appraisal on April 30, the umpire's decision on May 4, and the court's order on May 27
did Villa Highlands bring any motion before the court asking the court to vacate the umpire's.
decision and to declare what types of costs may be appropriately included in the appraisal under
the terms of the insurance policy. Instead of bringing a motion asking the court to grant the relief
requested under the declaratory action by declaring the appraisal process or umpire's decision
invalid, Villa Highlands stipulated to the damages sought at trial, thereby rendering the appraisal
process moot since the end result of the appraisal process would otherwise have been the basis
for determining damages. On May 22, Villa Highlands dld object to Western Community's
proposed judgment on the grounds "that not all claims pending against Western Community
have been dismissed with prejudice," but Villa Highlands did not explain what claims or
controversies remained for the court to decide. (PI.' s Objection to Proposed J. Submitted by
Western Community 2.)
Only when Villa Highlands brought the motion for relief from judgment was the court
made aware that Villa Highlands wanted to contest the appraisal process and the umpire's
decision. In support of its motion, Villa Highlands argues that the court has the authority to
overturn

an

umpire's decision on the basis of two cases, one from Iowa and the other from

Texas. See Central Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna & Surety Co., 466 N.W,2d 257 (Iowa 1991); Wells v,

American States Preferred Ins, Co., 919 S.W. 2d 679 (Tex. Ct, App. 1996). But besides the fact
that these cases are not binding precedent, those cases are distinguishable from the present case
because unlike this case, the issue of whether an umpire's decision should be held binding or
vacated was the central case and controversy brought before each district court, The parties in the
Iowa and Texas cases were specific in their claims and motions in asking the courts to resolve
issues regarding the appraisal processes and the umpires' (or appraisal panel's) decisions.

In the Iowa case, the insurer filed a declaratory action asking the court to vacate the
umpire's award, and the insured filed an action seeking enforcement and damages for a bad faith
refusal to pay the award. Central Life Ins. Co., 466 N.W.2d at 259. The district court upheld the
7
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umpire's appraisal award on summary judgment, but the Iowa Supreme Court decided that the
umpire's decision was null and void because the umpire had a pecuniary interest in the outcome
of his decision. Id. at 259, 262. The relevant fact for this case is that the validity of the umpire's
decision was an issue specifically raised in the declaratory action, the counterclaim, and the
summary judgment motions.
In the Texas case, the insurer brought a suit for declaratory judgment asking the coun to

declare that the appraisal process had been properly invoked and to require the insured to submit
its claim to appraisal; the insured filed a counterclaim and other causes of action. Wells, 919
S.W. 2d at 681-82. On motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled that the appraisal
award was binding. Id. at 682. The Court of Appeals of Texas found as a matter of law that the
appraisal panel improperly detennined the cause of damage and ruled that whether the appraisal
value, as determined by the appraisal panel, could be awarded depended on what was found to be
the cause of damage at trial. Id. at 685-86. Like the Iowa case, the decisions in the case revolved
around the validity of the appraisal panel's decision as specifically raised in the complaint, the
counterclaim, and the summary judgment motions.

Central Life Ins. and Wells are distinguishable from this case because Villa Highlands did
not bring a declaratory action or any motion asking the coun to vacate the decision of the umpire
until the trial was over and the court had dismissed the declaratory action. Instead, Villa
Highlands brought a declaratory action asking the court to determine its rights and obligations
under the contract, and the court did that. The court determined that "value" is "actual cash
value" and determined that the parties were to engage in the appraisal process. At the time the
declaratory action was dismissed, the court was unaware of any dispute between the panies that
remained and needed to be decided by the court in iegard to the way that tlie appraisal process
was conducted. Furthermore, the court understood the decision of the umpire to be binding, and
the parties did not bring any motion challenging the binding nature of the ump{re' s decision.
Prior to the umpire's decision, neither Villa Highlands nor Westem contested the court's
understanding that the umpire's decision would conclude any declaratory action because no case
or controversy would remain. After the umpire rendered a decision, and on the eve of trial, Villa
Highlands infonned the court that it was reserving the right to contest the appraisal process on

appeal and was not contesting it for the purpose of trial, but Villa Highlands did not tell the court
that there were remaining issues or controversies that needed to be decided by the district court

in the current suit. In fact, instead of informing the court that a controversy or issue remained for
the court to decide, Villa Highlands stipulated to the amount of damages that resulted from the
8
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underinsurance. Thus, when the trial was over, the court believed that no controversy remained
to be decided under the declaratory action and dismissed Count Six of the Second Amended
Complaint-the request for declaratory relief.
There are two problems with Villa Highlands' motion for relief from judgment, First,
Villa Highlands is essentially asking the court to use a relief from judgment motion to vacate an
umpire's decision. Just as the court cannot reconsider the legal basis for its decision on this
motion, so it cannot reconsider whether the umpire's decision had an appropriate legal/
contractual bruiis when the issue had not been previously presented to the court. See First Bank &
Trust of Idaho,
lnc., 112 Idaho at 32.. Second, Villa Highlands is essentially seeking to
recover
.
. ,.
". -~..-~ ~- .......
money from Western Community that it was not able to recover at trial by bringing a new claim

that the appraisal process did not work. Had the appraisal process been completed and Villa
Highlands obtained a determination that its appraisal gave the correct value, the claims tried to
the jury would have been unnecessary, After trial is not the time to contest an appraisal
process-to bring a new legal theory before the court-that has the potential to impact what
damages were sought at trial. See id.
By not filing a timely motion to contest the appraisal process and by waiting to raise the
issue until the filing of this Rule 60(b) motion, Villa Highlands cannot now be heard on this

issue. Although Villa Highlands is now claiming there may have been problems in the appraisal
process, those issues should have been resolved before the jury trial. That Villa Highlands failed
to take action and present a justiciable issue before the judgment was entered is not a unique and
compelling circumstance justifying relief from the judgment. Matter of Estate of Bagley, 117
Idaho at 1093.
Plaintiff's motion to grant relief from judgment is therefore DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 261b day of August, 2008.

Darla Williamson, District Judge
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I hereby certify that on this date I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
to:

Richard C. Boardman
Cynthia Yee-Wallace
251 E, Front Street, Ste 400
Boise, Idaho 83702
Karen Sheehan

P.O. Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Robert A. Anderson
P.O. Box 7426
:Boise, Idaho 83707-7426

Dated this&day of August, 2008

'.
!
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250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
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Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant
Western Community Ins. Co. and
Defendant Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.
of Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

VILLA. HIGHLANDS. LLC, an Idaho limited

Case No. CV OC 0621175

liability company,
Plaintiff,

vs.

STIPULATION RE: VILLA
HIGHLANDS APPRAISAL

WESTERN COMMUNITY INSURANCE
CO., an Idaho corporation; FARM
BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF IDAHO, an Idaho
corporation; DALE E. ZIMNEY; and DOES

1-V,

Defendants.

STIPULATION RI:: VILLA HIGHLANDS APPRAISAL - 1

WESTERN COMMUNITY INSURANCE
CO., an Idaho corporation,

Counterclaimant,
vs.
VILLA HIGHLANDS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,

Counterdefendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Villa Highlands, LLC and Defendants, Western
Community Insurance Company and Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho,
by and through their counsel of record, and stipulate and agree that, for purposes of
this litigation, the following values will be utilized, appraising the fair market value of
the covered property at issue and the cost of repair of the damaged property:
1.

The fully appraised fair market value of the subject building on the date of

completion including, but not limited to and inclusive of, factors such as
entrepreneurial profit, s.oft costs and hard costs under § § A(1 l and F(2) of Villa
Highlands' Builder's Risk Policy, shall be calculated as: $7,580,000;
2.

The amount of the loss (repair/replacement cost), under§§ E(4) and F(2)

of Villa Highlands' Builder's Risk Policy, shall be calculated as: $3,967,157.00.
The parties also agree that this. stipulation otherwise satisfies the appraisal
conditions set forth in § (EH2) of Villa Highlands' Builder's Risk Policy.

STIPULATION l'\E: VILLI!, HIGHLANDS APPRAISAL - 2

..,r--DATED this lb day of January, 2008.

By_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Robert A. Anderson, Of the Firm
Attorneys
for
Defendant/Counterclaimant Western Community Ins. Co.
and Defendant Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.
Co. of Idaho

· DATED this

day of January, 2008.
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX, LLP

By_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Ed Guerricabeitia, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff Villa Highlands,
LLC
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DATED this_ day of January, 2008.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP

By_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Robert A. Anderson, Of the Firm
Attorneys
for
Defendant/Counterclaimant Western Community Ins, Co.
and Defendant Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.
Co. of Idaho

DATED this

t'

day of Jenuary, 2008.

DA VlSON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX, LLP

=

By~~<
Ed Guerricabeitia, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff Villa Highlands,
LLC
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